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Causarum Investigatio and the Two Bell’s
Theorems of John Bell
Howard M. Wiseman and Eric G. Cavalcanti
Abstract “Bell’s theorem” can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved,
the first in 1964 and the second in 1976. His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of
quantum phenomena with the joint assumptions of LOCALITY and PREDETERMI-
NATION. His 1976 theorem is their incompatibility with the single property of LO-
CAL CAUSALITY. This is contrary to Bell’s own later assertions, that his 1964 the-
orem began with the assumption of LOCAL CAUSALITY, even if not by that name.
Although the two Bell’s theorems are logically equivalent, their assumptions are not.
Hence, the earlier and later theorems suggest quite different conclusions, embraced
by operationalists and realists, respectively. The key issue is whether LOCALITY
or LOCAL CAUSALITY is the appropriate notion emanating from RELATIVISTIC
CAUSALITY, and this rests on one’s basic notion of causation. For operationalists
the appropriate notion is what is here called the Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION,
while for realists it is REICHENBACH’s Principle of common cause. By breaking
down the latter into even more basic Postulates, it is possible to obtain a version
of Bell’s theorem in which each camp could reject one assumption, happy that the
remaining assumptions reflect its weltanschauung. Formulating Bell’s theorem in
terms of causation is fruitful not just for attempting to reconcile the two camps, but
also for better describing the ontology of different quantum interpretations and for
more deeply understanding the implications of Bell’s marvellous work.
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2 Howard M. Wiseman and Eric G. Cavalcanti
1 Motivation
The work presented here grew from my1 observation, over the years, but particularly
at a quantum foundations conference in 2013 (see Ref. [1]), that different ‘camps’ of
physicists and philosophers have a different understanding of what Bell’s theorem
actually is, and a different understanding of the words (in particular ‘locality’) often
used in stating it. As a consequence they often talk (or shout) past one another, and
come no closer to understanding each other’s perspective. I have friends in both
camps, and I would like to think that they are all reasonable people who should be
able to come to terms that allow the pros and cons of different interpretations of
Bell’s theorem to be discussed calmly.
More recently, my thinking has evolved beyond this original motivation, as a
consequence of the 50th anniversary of Bell’s annus mirabilis2, which led to three
invitations to present on the topic: for a special issue of J. Phys. A [4], for an opinion
piece in Nature [5], and for the Quantum [Un]speakables conference (and thus to a
fourth invitation, for these Proceedings). These challenged me to think more deeply
about what lay behind the different positions of the two camps, and how this could
lead to a deeper understanding of Bell’s theorem. The key to my reconsideration
is to be found, conveniently, on the the magnificent ceiling of the Festsaal of the
Austrian Akademie der Wißenschaften, host to Alain Aspect’s public lecture at the
Quantum [Un]speakables conference. There, one finds the role of natural philoso-
phy defined as causarum investigatio (Fig: 1). The investigation of causes, or, more
particularly, of notions of causation, has proven to be a very fruitful way to analyse
Bell’s theorem, and the disagreements over it [6, 7, 8, 4, 5].
While this chapter, Ref. [5], and Ref. [4], each has independent material, they all
share some core material, which can be summarized as follows. Bell actually proved
two theorems (Sec. 3). The 1964 one [3] is that
[some of] the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with separable
[i.e. local] predetermination.
This involves two assumptions: “separability or locality” and the “predetermination
[of] the result of an individual measurement” [3]. The 1976 one [9] is that
quantum mechanics is not embeddable in a locally causal theory
and involves a single assumption, “local causality” [9]. Although each theorem is a
corollary of the other (Sec. 3.3), they are embraced by different intellectual camps,
1 This first section is written in first person by one of us (Wiseman), who spoke at the Quantum
[Un]speakables conference. The other of us (Cavalcanti) has been a long-time co-worker and cor-
respondent with Wiseman on Bell’s theorem. In particular, since the conference, their discussions
have convinced Wiseman of a better way to formulate the causal assumptions in Bell’s theorem,
and this is reflected in the latter parts of the paper, and in its authorship.
2 It was the year he wrote his review of hidden variables (HVs) [2], by misfortune not published
until 1966, in which he dismissed von Neumann’s anti-HV proof, gave the first proof of the ne-
cessity of contextuality for deterministic HV theories, and raised the question of the necessity of
nonlocality, which he immediately answered in the positive in his 1964 paper [3].
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Fig. 1 Scene from the ceiling of the Festsaal of the Austrian Akademie der Wißenschaften
whom I will call operationalists and realists respectively (Sec. 4). The latter, how-
ever, deny that there are really two different theorems, claiming that in his 1964
paper Bell used ‘locality’ to mean LOCAL CAUSALITY, and that from it he derived
PREDETERMINATION3 rather than assuming it. I have argued in depth [4, 11] that
this is a misrepresentation of what Bell proved in 1964.
Whether LOCALITY or LOCAL CAUSALITY is the appropriate notion emanating
from Einstein’s Principle of relativity rests on one’s underlying concept of causation.
Operationalists and realists implicitly hold to quite different notions of causation and
it is fruitful to make this explicit (Sec. 5). These last points lead on to the notable
new material in this chapter: a form of Bell’s theorem that could be acceptable to
both camps (Sec. 6), and discussion of the many other advantages of formulating
Bell’s theorem in terms of causation (Sec. 7).
3 In earlier, albeit recent, publications [5, 4] I used the term ‘determinism’ for Bell’s second as-
sumption in 1964. However, Bell did not actually use this word in 1964, and it is useful to reserve
it for a different notion [10]. Note the use here of small-capitals for terms with a precise technical
meaning, even when the relevant definition is given only at a later point in the chapter.
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Fig. 2 Minkowski diagram for the scenario Bell introduced in 1964. Time is the vertical axis, space
horizontal, and the diagonal lines indicate the boundaries of light-cones.
2 The situation Bell considered
The experimental situation Bell considered is shown as a Minkowski (space-time)
diagram in Fig. 2. This is closely based on such diagrams which Bell used in
Refs. [9, 12], for example. He did not use such a diagram in 1964, and only briefly
referred to relativistic concepts, but the diagrams he used in his definitive paper on
the subject [12] are applicable to, and even use the same notation as, his original
1964 paper. It is convenient to use something close to the form of diagram which
Bell finally settled upon [12], as it allows the assumptions from both those theorems
(LOCALITY and PREDETERMINATION in 1964; LOCAL CAUSALITY in 1976) to be
stated naturally. Considering more general distributions of events in space-time lead
to different conclusions about which assumptions can be stated naturally; see Sec. 7
and Ref. [10].
The experiment involves two observers, Alice and Bob, with spatially sepa-
rated laboratories, where they perform experiments that are independent, but may
have correlated outcomes. This allows them to perform experiments in space-like-
separated regions of space-time, labelledA andB respectively. In her region, Alice
makes a free choice a of setting for her measurement, which yields an outcome A,
and Bob likewise, mutatis mutandis. In the overlap of the past light-cones of A
and B is a preparation event c which is necessary to produce the correlations be-
tween the outcomes. Even for a fixed preparation c, the ability of Alice and Bob to
make free choices, and the existence of multiple possible outcomes, gives rise to a
PHENOMENON described by the relative frequencies4
{ f (A,B|a,b,c) : A,B,a,b}. (1)
The existence of correlations in the outcomes in a physics experiment is typically
‘explained’ by stepping away from operationalist language, in a manner such as this:
4 Note that here we are not making a commitment to frequentism, but rather simply recognising
that real experimental data are relative frequencies.
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the event c prepares a correlated pair of particles, one of which goes to A and the
other toB, each at subluminal speed.
Stepping even further away from operationalism, we follow Bell in allowing for
the possibility of non-observable (or “hidden”) variables in the formalism, intro-
ducing variables λ , defined at a time — i.e. on a space-like hypersurface (SLH)
— before a and b but after c, that could describe these particles, or anything else
of relevance5. Note in particular that λ could represent a pure quantum state |λ 〉,
since this is a mathematical object defined on a SLH. If the source c reliably pro-
duces this particular pure state then this |λ 〉 would contain no more information
than is already given by specifying c. But this is an idealization, and in general |λ 〉
would have some distribution given c, and so is just like any other hidden variable.
In general, we say that a MODEL (which Bell [3] called a ‘theory’) θ for the above
PHENOMENON, comprises a probability distribution for hidden variables, Pθ (λ |c),
and further probabilities Pθ (A,B|a,b,c,λ ), such that6
∑
λ
Pθ (A,B|a,b,c,λ )Pθ (λ |c) = f (A,B|a,b,c). (2)
Note that by considering a MODEL with non-trivial dependence on λ , one is not
presuming PREDETERMINATION of outcomes:
Definition 1 (PREDETERMINATION). ∀ A,a,B,b,λ , Pθ (A,B|a,b,c,λ ) ∈ {0,1}.
(See the next section for the source of this terminology.) An example of a hidden
variable MODEL that is stochastic (i.e. that violates PREDETERMINATION) is the
one mentioned above, where c prepares a mixed quantum state ρc and λ is taken to
define a pure quantum state |λ 〉 such that ρc = ∑λ Pθ (λ |c) |λ 〉〈λ |.
Note also that PREDETERMINATION should not be confused with the stronger
and purely operational notion of PREDICTABILITY [13]:
Definition 2 (PREDICTABILITY). ∀ A,a,B,b, f (A,B|a,b,c) ∈ {0,1}.
While we have defined PREDICTABILITY in terms of the experimental frequencies
f (A,B|a,b,c), for a given MODEL it is of course possible to determine whether the
PHENOMENON it is supposed to describe has this property, via Eq. (2). The point
is that a MODEL may satisfy PREDETERMINATION even though the PHENOMENON
does not satisfy PREDICTABILITY.
3 The Two Bell’s Theorem of John Bell
In this section we present the two theorems, in chronological order, and then discuss
the relationship between them.
5 More generally [12], one could sandwich these variables between two suitable SLHs, but the
above formulation will suffice.
6 Given footnote 4, this equation is not to be read as a strict equality, but as carrying the same
meaning as that of any probabilistic prediction.
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3.1 Bell’s 1964 theorem
In Bell’s 1964 paper he states what he has proven most clearly in his Conclusion
(Section VI):
In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to determine the results
of individual measurements, without changing the statistical predictions, there must be a
mechanism whereby the setting of one measuring device can influence the reading of an-
other instrument, however remote.
Here the italics, added by us, emphasize the two assumptions that lead to a contra-
diction with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics; the second assumption
is stated in the negative, since its negation follows if one holds to the first assump-
tion. These two assumptions are stated positively, with equal status, in the immediate
preceding sentence, at the end of his Section V:
for at least one . . . state . . . the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are incompati-
ble with separable predetermination
as quoted in Sec. 1 above. As was noted there, Bell did not distinguish separability
from locality, and he is explicit that PREDETERMINATION means “predetermination
[of] the result of an individual measurement”. Thus his theorem is:
Theorem 1 (Bell-1964). There exist quantum PHENOMENA for which there is no
MODEL satisfying PREDETERMINATION and LOCALITY.
Although this was not the case in 1964, the quantum phenomena relevant to Bell’s
theorem have long since been verified experimentally, albeit with a few challenging
loopholes [5, 14].
It is presumably uncontroversial to understand PREDETERMINATION as per Def-
inition 1 already given above. The meaning of LOCALITY is more controversial, to
say the least (compare Refs. [15, 16] with Refs. [4, 11]). However, by our reading,
Bell is quite clear:
the requirement of locality [is] more precisely that the result of a measurement on one
system be unaffected by operations on a distant system
This is of course the positive form of the final notion in the first quote in this section,
and Bell states the same assumption (the irrelevance of Alice’s measurement choice
to Bob’s outcome) twice more in the paper. Although he successfully applies the
notion of locality only to theories with predetermined outcomes, he introduces it
prior to making the assumption of predetermination7. Thus it seems that we should
adopt a definition that accords with his words and applies to probabilistic theories:
7 He introduces it in the first paragraph of the paper proper, which serves as motivation for the
formulation of the assumptions he will use. There, Bell unfortunately misapplies his notion, in
attempting to derive predetermination via EPR-Bohm-correlations and locality. See Refs. [4, 11]
for discussions of the irrelevance of this flawed paragraph to Bell’s 1964 theorem (i.e. the “result
to be proved”, as he calls it, which he does indeed prove).
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Definition 3 (LOCALITY).
∀ a,B,b,λ , Pθ (B|a,b,c,λ ) = Pθ (B|b,c,λ ),
and likewise for Alice’s result, which will remain unstated in similar definitions be-
low. (The existence of the function Pθ (B|b,c,λ ) is also implicit here, and in similar
definitions below.) This definition of LOCALITY was also the one adopted by Jarrett
in 1984 [17]. In the same year Shimony [18] coined the phrase “parameter indepen-
dence” for the same concept, to emphasize that it required only that Bob’s outcome
be statistically independent of Alice’s setting, a controllable ‘parameter’. We prefer
to follow the terminology of Jarrett and (in our reading) Bell.
Note that LOCALITY is not the same [13] as the purely operational notion of
Definition 4 (SIGNAL-LOCALITY).
∀ a,B,b, f (B|a,b,c) = f (B|b,c),
the violation of which has never been observed, and, most physicists think, never
will be observed. However, for a strictly operational MODEL (that is, one that makes
no use of hidden variables, be they pure quantum states or other objects) there is no
distinction between LOCALITY and SIGNAL-LOCALITY. Thus, operational quan-
tum mechanics, involving only preparations, settings, and outcomes, satisfies LO-
CALITY. In fact, LOCALITY is satisfied even in the non-operational quantum theory
discussed above, where c prepares ρc but one assumes that, conditional on the hid-
den variable λ , the probabilities of outcomes are determined by |λ 〉. In both cases,
the reduced quantum state on Bob’s side, which is mixed in general, defines prob-
abilities for Bob’s outcomes, for any measurement he makes, which are indepen-
dent of Alice’s choice of measurement. Moreover, introducing a realist narrative,
involving instantaneous wave-function collapse, makes no difference to the fact that
LOCALITY is satisfied, as a mathematical statement about the probability distribu-
tions in the theory. Even spontaneous collapse theories such as the celebrated GRW
model [19] respect LOCALITY (to the extent that they respect SIGNAL-LOCALITY).
3.2 Bell’s 1976 theorem
More than a decade after his 1964 paper, Bell reformulated his theorem in a way
that he would cleave to, in essence, for the rest of his life. Building on his own work
from 1971 [20] and that of Clauser and Horne from 1974 [21], he introduced a new
notion:
Definition 5 (LOCAL CAUSALITY).
∀ A,a,B,b,λ , Pθ (B|A,a,b,c,λ ) = Pθ (B|b,c,λ ).
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Strictly speaking (and Bell was strict about this [9]), the above is a consequence of
the broader Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY (Principle 2 in Sec. 5.1 below) when
applied to the specific set up of Fig. 2. Note the crucial difference from LOCALITY in
that LOCAL CAUSALITY requires Bob’s outcome to be statistically independent of
Alice’s outcome as well as her setting. This, Bell argued, is a reasonable ‘localistic’
notion for a theory in which λ provides a complete description of the relevant state
of affairs prior to the measurements being performed.
As quoted in Sec. 1, Bell proved in 1976 that
quantum mechanics is not embeddable in a locally causal theory as formulated [above].
In other words, he proved a theorem involving only a single assumption:
Theorem 2 (Bell-1976). There exist quantum PHENOMENA for which there is no
MODEL satisfying LOCAL CAUSALITY.
Unfortunately for our purposes, having invented a new concept with a new name,
Bell immediately became indiscriminate once more, using “local causality” and ‘lo-
cality’ interchangeably8. However, in his most mature treatment of the subject [12],
Bell unequivocally showed his preference for the term “local causality” [4], and in
following suit we respect Bell’s final will.
3.3 A Fine Distinction
Bell’s 1976 theorem implies Bell’s 1964 theorem. This is because, as is easy to
see, any MODEL θ satisfying LOCALITY and PREDETERMINATION satisfies LOCAL
CAUSALITY. The converse of that last clause is not true; there are theories satisfying
LOCAL CAUSALITY that do not satisfy LOCALITY and PREDETERMINATION. Or-
thodox quantum mechanics with separable states is one example. Nevertheless, the
converse of the first sentence of this subsection is true. That is, Bell’s 1964 theorem
implies Bell’s 1976 theorem. This is because of the following:
Theorem 3 (Fine-1982). For any PHENOMENON, there exists a MODEL θ satisfying
LOCAL CAUSALITY if and only if there exists a MODEL θ ′ satisfying PREDETER-
MINATION and LOCALITY.
Although we have given the credit here to Fine [23], this result was known, in
essence, by Bell even in 1971 [20]; see Ref. [4] for details. For this reason, it is use-
ful shorthand to introduce the well-known term Bell-local for describing the type of
MODEL that satisfies the broader assumptions of Bell’s 1976 theorem. That is,
8 Indeed, by 1981 [22] he was implying that by ‘locality’ he had always meant LOCAL CAUSALITY.
This historical revisionism is perfectly understandable, and probably unconscious — a plausible
unfolding of the localistic intuition Bell had in 1964 is LOCAL CAUSALITY, since this would have
worked, where LOCALITY failed, in Bell’s attempt to reproduce the EPR argument (see footnote 7).
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Definition 6 (BELL-LOCAL). A MODEL θ is BELL-LOCAL if and only if
∀ A,a,B,b, Pθ (A,B|a,b,c) =∑
λ
Pθ (A|a,c,λ )Pθ (B|b,c,λ )Pθ (λ |c). (3)
If the two Bell’s theorems are logically equivalent, why should we bother to dis-
tinguish them? The answer is that the two different forms appeal to two different
camps of scholars, and indeed these two camps often recognise only the one form
that they favour. The broad term ‘scholars’ here is deliberately chosen to cover the
increasing range of disciplines — including (at least) physics, philosophy, and in-
formation science — interested in Bell’s theorem. But it is important to note that
the division into two different camps does not sharply follow these disciplinary di-
visions. Of course there are many more than two attitudes towards Bell’s theorem.
Nevertheless, the most common attitudes can be broadly grouped within the two
camps, called here operationalist and realist.
4 The Two Camps
The realist camp [24, 25, 15, 26] has the following credo:
Bell’s theorem uses only one assumption: local causality (or ‘locality’ as we usually call it
for short). This is the only reasonable way to apply the principle of relativity for statistical
theories. It is essentially what EPR assumed in 1935. They showed that operational quan-
tum mechanics is nonlocal, and Bell showed in 1964 that adding hidden variables cannot
solve the problem. Experiments violating a Bell inequality thus leave us with no option: the
principle of relativity is false. The world is nonlocal.
The operationalist camp [6, 27, 28, 29], on the other hand, could be caricatured by
the following:
Bell’s theorem uses two assumptions. The first assumption is locality. This is essentially
the same as signal locality, which is all the principle of relativity implies, but also applies
to hidden variable theories. Orthodox quantum mechanics respects locality. The second
assumption is something else which has been variously called realism, predetermination,
determinism, objectivity, classicality, counter-factual-definiteness, and causality (perhaps
with slightly different formulations). Clearly it is the second assumption that we should
abandon, whatever we call it. Locality is here to stay.
Why do the two camps come to such contrary conclusions? Partly it is just a dif-
ference in terminology: realists use ‘locality’ to mean LOCAL CAUSALITY, while
operationalists use it to mean LOCALITY. But the deeper question is why they dis-
agree about which is the ‘correct’ way to apply the principle of relativity. Bell well
explains the motivations of the realist camp [12]:
The obvious definition of “local causality” does not work in quantum mechanics, and this
cannot be attributed to the “incompleteness” of that theory. . . .
Do we then have to fall back on “no signalling faster than light” as the expression of
the fundamental causal structure of contemporary theoretical physics? That is hard for me
to accept. For one thing we have lost the idea that correlations can be explained . . . . More
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importantly, the “no signalling” notion rests on concepts which are desperately vague . . . .
The assertion that “we cannot signal faster than light” immediately provokes the question:
“Who do we think we are?”
Here the italics, added by us (except for the ‘we’ in the final question), emphasize
the two key tenets of the realist camp: that correlations should be explained, and that
anthropocentric notions such as ‘signalling’ should play no fundamental role.
An operationalist, however, could well claim to know well enough who ‘we’
are, and point out that that statements about what we may, or may not, be able to
do are very useful, for example in informational security proofs. From an oper-
ationalist perspective, moreover, explanations, in the sense Bell means, might be
regarded as superfluous. These differences between realists and operationalists hark
back to Einstein’s 1919 distinction between constructive theories and principle the-
ories [30]. But a more precise understanding of the origin of the disagreement is
possible by breaking down the assumptions used in Bell’s theorem to a more basic
level (Sec. 5). As we will see, this is also the way towards enabling the two camps to
discuss Bell’s theorem using the same terms, agreeing on what combinations of as-
sumptions it implies to be impossible9, even while disagreeing on which assumption
is most implausible (Sec. 6).
5 Back to Basics
Here we make a fresh start, aiming to base Bell’s theorem on notions more com-
prehensive and more fundamental than those defined earlier in this chapter with
reference to the particular scenario of Sec. 2. Those earlier notions are temporarily
abandoned, but they will gradually be reintroduced and their relation to the deeper
concepts indicated.
To begin, we introduce some axioms. In calling them ‘axioms’ we are not imply-
ing that they are unquestionable, only that we will not question their necessity in the
formulations of Bell’s theorem below. Without further ado:
Axiom 1 (MACROREALITY) An event observed by any observer is a real sin-
gle event, and not ‘relative’ to anything or anyone.
This rules out consideration of the “relative state” [31] or “many worlds” [32] inter-
pretation, as well as the extreme subjectivism of the ‘QBist’ interpretation [33].
9 This is always assuming that a loophole-free test, expected soon [5, 14] will not turn up any
surprises.
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Axiom 2 (MINKOWSKI SPACE-TIME) Concepts such as space-like separa-
tion, light-cones, and foliations of SLHs are well defined in ordinary labo-
ratory situations.
This rules out short-cuts through space (‘wormholes’) between distant locations [34].
There is actually no need to restrict to flat space-time; any time-orientable Lorentzian
space-time manifold will do, but the above terminology is more straight-forward.
Axiom 3 (TEMPORAL ORDER) For any event A, there is a SLH containing A
that separates events in the PAST of A from events that have A in their PAST.
Note the term PAST is not, in this axiom, to be understood as having definite mean-
ing; the font used is meant to alert the reader to this fact. In particular, there is no
implication that all events on one side of the SLH are in the PAST of A and all
events on the other side in the future of A (i.e. having A in their PAST). For example,
TEMPORAL ORDER is satisfied if we take PAST to mean the past light-cone, which
defines only a partial ordering of events (that is, for some pairs of events, neither is
in the PAST of the other). To define an almost-total ordering of events (that is, such
that for almost every pair of events, one of them is in the PAST of the other) one
would need to define PAST via a fixed foliation of SLHs.
Axiom 4 (CAUSAL ARROW) Any CAUSE of an event is in its PAST.
This axiom, together with axioms 2 and 3, implies a causal structure describable by
a directed acyclic graph, as is standard in modelling of causation [7]. It rules out
retrocausal approaches to Bell’s theorem such as in Refs. [35, 36]. Note that, like
PAST above, CAUSE here does not yet have any precise meaning. The meaning of
these concepts will become more defined as more assumptions are added.
In moving now from axioms to postulates, we list assumptions that are more
likely to be questioned, or at least that were questioned, in some form, relatively
early in the literature on Bell’s theorem. Indeed, if one accepts the Axioms then one
must (modulo the remaining experimental loopholes) reject one of the postulates
below, as we will show in Sec. 6. The first postulate (which was listed as an Axiom
in Ref [4]) begins the process of adding meaning to ‘CAUSE’:
Postulate 1 (FREE CHOICE) A freely chosen action has no relevant CAUSES.
Here, ‘relevant’ means “in common with, or among, the other events under study.”
This postulate is not meant to indicate a philosophical commitment to Cartesian du-
alism, or a religious commitment to Pelagianism, although it is possibly incompat-
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ible with Augustinian predestination10. Here, it serves to rule out (when combined
with other principles) what Bell called ‘superdeterminism’ [12]. The ‘super’ in ‘su-
perdeterminism’ indicates that free choices would not just have causes as a matter
of principle (as believed by those who hold to the ‘determinist’ philosophy of free
will). Rather, they would of necessity have causes that are correlated in a very partic-
ular way with external physical variables that affect the outcomes of measurements.
Although this viewpoint has at least one prominent scientific proponent [37], our
personal view is that Postulate 1 is as unquestionable as any of the Axioms above;
see footnote 14 below.
Postulate 2 (RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY) The PAST is the past light-cone.
Note that a term like “past light-cone” is to be understood as having definite mean-
ing, from the Axiom of MINKOWSKI SPACE-TIME.
Postulate 3 (COMMON CAUSES) If two sets of events A and B are corre-
lated, and no event in either is a CAUSE of any event in the other, then they
have a set of common CAUSES C that EXPLAINS the correlation.
Here, common CAUSES means events that are CAUSES of at least one event in A
and at least one event inB. It is important to note that this postulate is not the same
as REICHENBACH’s Principle of common cause [38]. Rather, following Ref. [8]
(although with some differences in details) we have deliberately split Reichenbach’s
celebrated principle into the above Postulate of COMMON CAUSES, and the below
Postulate 4 (DECORRELATING EXPLANATION) A set of CAUSES C , com-
mon to two set of events A and B, EXPLAINS a correlation between A and
B only if conditioning on C eliminates the correlation.
As Reichenbach said [38], “When we say that the common cause explains the [cor-
relation], we refer . . . to the fact that relative to the cause the events A and B are
mutually independent.”
In the above principles we referred always to events, but for statistical concepts
such as correlation it is more common for physicists to think in terms of variables. In
such cases we will be loose with notation and terminology, and allow, for instance, A
to stand for the outcome that Alice gets (a variable) as well as the event that Alice’s
outcome takes the value A.
10 Les passions de l’aˆme (1649), De natura (415), and De natura et gratia (415) respectively.
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5.1 Realist Principles
The axioms and postulates above form (as we will see in Sec. 6) a nice set in that they
are sufficient to enforce BELL-LOCALITY, and, with one exception, all necessary.
(The one exception is TEMPORAL ORDER, which is not needed if one assumes REL-
ATIVISTIC CAUSALITY.) However they do not correspond to the principles stated
in Bell’s two theorems, and hence do not obviously connect to the two camps. Thus
we will develop principles that do relate to the two camps (starting with realists) and
show their relation to the postulates above.
First, since the explanation of correlations is a realist tenet, realists hold to RE-
ICHENBACH’s Principle, which we state here explicitly,
Principle 1 (REICHENBACH) If two sets of eventsA andB are correlated, and no
event in either is a CAUSE of any event in the other, then they have a set of common
CAUSES C , such that conditioning on C eliminates the correlation.
For realists, this is the point of causation — to explain correlations. However we
made that a separate assumption, as discussed above, and as captured by this:
Lemma 1. The postulates of COMMON CAUSES and DECORRELATING EXPLANA-
TION imply REICHENBACH’s Principle.
For realists, the role of REICHENBACH’s principle is in this:
Lemma 2. REICHENBACH’s Principle and the Postulate of RELATIVISTIC CAUSAL-
ITY imply the Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY,
if we define the last generally, basically as Bell did in 1976, as
Principle 2 (LOCAL CAUSALITY) If two space-like separated sets of eventsA and
B are correlated, then there is a set of events C in their common Minkowski past
such that conditioning on C eliminates the correlation.
Here the common Minkowski past means the intersection of the union of past light-
cones of events in A with the union of past light-cones of events inB.
The reader may well ask how this Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY relates to
the definition 5. Take the two sets of events in Principle 2 to be A = (A,a) and
B= (B,b). Thus if LOCAL CAUSALITY is satisfied there must exist a set of CAUSES
C in their common Minkowski past such that P(A,a,B,b|C ) = P(A,a|C )P(B,b|C ).
Thus, P(B,b|A,a,C ) = P(B,b|C ), and P(B|A,a,b,C ) = P(B|b,C ). Replacing C
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by Bell’s variables c and λ ,11 a sufficient specification of the causes by assumption,
gives definition 5.
This is not, however, sufficient to derive a contradiction with quantum phenom-
ena. It was sufficient in Sec. 3 because there we were working within the framework
of our definition of a MODEL in Eq. (2). Here we want a more principled deriva-
tion of the condition of BELL-LOCALITY, in Eq. (3). For this it is necessary to use
an additional assumption related to the Postulate of FREE CHOICE. Specifically, we
combine this postulate with other postulates:
Lemma 3. The Postulates of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY and COMMON CAUSES
and FREE CHOICE imply the Principle of LOCAL AGENCY,
where we have defined (for terminological reasons to be explained elsewhere [10])
Principle 3 (LOCAL AGENCY) The only relevant events correlated with a free choice
are in its future light cone.
This assumption was not stated precisely by Bell in 1976, who said only “It has been
assumed that the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables . . . .”12.
However, according to Bell in 1977 [41] what he meant by this, in the context of
theories satisfying LOCAL CAUSALITY, was that “the values of such variables have
implications only in their future light cones,” in other words, the above Principle of
LOCAL AGENCY.
It is worth noting, however, that Bell does not actually need a Principle as strong
as this, but rather only (as he says two sentences later) that “In particular they
have no implications for the . . . variables in . . . [their] backward light cones.” This
11 The alert reader will have noticed some sleight of hand. In Bell’s 1976 paper, where he intro-
duced LOCAL CAUSALITY, λ denoted all events in the intersection of the past light-cones. But
in Ref. [12] Bell took the λ s to be defined between two SLHs, and the limit when these become
one corresponds to the situation he considered in 1964, where the λ s were “initial values of the
[relevant] variables at some suitable instant.” As in Fig. 2, that suitable instant (SLH) may not
even cross the intersection of the past light-cones. The resolution is that since, by assumption, the
variables {λ} are the only relevant ones, they must carry the information that was present in the
common causes C in the common Minkowski past of A and B. This they can without falling foul
of LOCAL CAUSALITY (in the sense of Principle 2) because there is a part of the SLH that is in the
future light-cone of the events in C , but in the past light-cone of A, and likewise for B.
12 Bell was immediately criticised for the vagueness of this statement (and for what followed,
some of which was not sufficient for his purpose) by Shimony, Horne, and Clauser [39]. The
immediacy was, according to Clauser [40], because the latter two authors had originally drafted
their 1974 paper [21] using the above Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY (or something like it), but
Shimony pointed out to them that this was not sufficient to derive BELL-LOCALITY without an
extra assumption relating to free choice. As a consequence they retreated from such a principled
formulation of LOCAL CAUSALITY to the more specific definition 5, which they said characterized
“objective local theories” [21], enabling a “less general and more plausible” [39] assumption (than
LOCAL AGENCY, for example) relating to free choice. Clauser and Horne [21] deserve credit for
first (as far as we are aware) discussing, in their footnote 13, the need for independence of the
hidden variables λ from the free choices a and b which is implicit in Eq. (2). They note that to
justify that assumption one has to rule out the “possibility” that “Systems originate within the
intersection of the backward light cones of both analyzers and the source . . . [which] effect [sic.]
both the experimenters’ selections of analyzer orientations and the emissions from the source.”
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weaker assumption follows (using Axioms 3 and 4 without RELATIVISTIC CAUSAL-
ITY) from the following
Principle 4 (AGENT-CAUSATION) If a set of relevant eventsA is correlated with a
freely chosen action, then that action is a CAUSE of at least one event in A .
This can be seen as follows. Assume that a is correlated with some event A. From
this Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION, a must be a cause of A. From Axiom 4, a must
be in the PAST of A. From Axiom 3, this means there must be a SLH separating a
and A. Thus, as claimed, A cannot be in the past light-cone of a. If one is making the
assumption of LOCAL CAUSALITY, then the Axioms need not be used, and one can
directly conclude from Principle 4 that A must be in the future light-cone of a. That
is, the Principles of AGENT-CAUSATION and LOCAL AGENCY become equivalent.
Now, to obtain Eq. (3) we must consider P(A,B|a,b,c), which can be written as
∑λ P(A,B|a,b,λ ,c)P(λ |a,b,c). With the location of events in Fig. 2, if the events in
C are in the common Minkowski past of A andB, they are not in the future light-
cone of either a or b. Thus from the principle of LOCAL AGENCY, P(λ |a,b,c) =
P(λ |c). Using LOCAL CAUSALITY as above then gives Eq. (3). Thus we have a
more principled version of Bell’s 1976 theorem:
Theorem 4 (Bell-1976, in principles). Quantum PHENOMENA violate the conjunc-
tion of Axioms 1–4, the Principle of LOCAL CAUSALITY, and the Principle of LO-
CAL AGENCY (or AGENT-CAUSATION).
From the lemmata in this section (noting that REICHENBACH’s Principle implies
the Principle of COMMON CAUSES, and applying this in Lemma 3), we can also
formulate this theorem using the more fundamental postulates as follows:
Theorem 5 (Bell-1976, in deeper principles). Quantum PHENOMENA violate the
conjunction of Axioms 1–4, the Postulate of FREE CHOICE, the Postulate of RELA-
TIVISTIC CAUSALITY, and REICHENBACH’s Principle.
These two theorems, and the relationship between them are illustrated in Fig. 3.
5.2 Operationalist Principles
As discussed in Sec. 4, a key difference between realists and operationalists is that
the former seek to explain correlations while the latter do not (or, at least, not in the
same sense). We have shown how realists can enshrine this goal in causal terms by
REICHENBACH’s Principle. Another key difference is that operationalists are happy
to put the actors in centre-stage. Thus, operationalists should be happy to accept
a notion of causation which is not about explaining all correlations, and which is
agent-centric: the Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION (Principle 4 above).
Just as combining REICHENBACH’s Principle with the Postulate of RELATIVIS-
TIC CAUSALITY gives LOCAL CAUSALITY (the realists’ favoured localist notion),
here we have:
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!!!Fig. 3 Two realist versions of Bell’s Theorem, 4 and 5. The coloured (shaded) boxes are conceptsused in the formulation in question, or upheld in the philosophy of the camp (here, realists) in
question. The black boxes are concepts used in the formulation in question, but rejected in the
philosophy of the camp in question. The white (pale) boxes are concepts not used in the formulation
in question and ignored in the philosophy of the camp in question. Underlined bold font is used
for the fundamental assumptions (2, 3, or 4 in number) of the formulation in question. The arrows
indicate that a particular concept holds if all concepts pointing to it (plus the Axioms) hold.
Lemma 4. The Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION plus the Postulate of RELATIVIS-
TIC CAUSALITY implies the Principle of LOCALITY,
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where we can provide the following principled version of LOCALITY:
Principle 5 (LOCALITY) The probability of an observable event A is unchanged by
conditioning on a space-like-separated free choice b, even if it is already condi-
tioned on other events not in the future light-cone of b.
This Lemma can be demonstrated as follows. Define A to be A and other events
not in the future light-cone of b. By Postulate 2, none of the events in A can have
b as a CAUSE. If b is a freely chosen action, then by Principle 4, A cannot be
correlated with b. Hence the probability of A, even conditional on other events in
A , is independent of b.
Note that LOCALITY is by no means the strongest principle that can be derived
from AGENT-CAUSATION and RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY; one can also show
Lemma 5. The Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION plus the Postulate of RELATIVIS-
TIC CAUSALITY implies the Principle of LOCAL AGENCY,
as defined in the preceding section (Principle 3). We use LOCALITY rather than
LOCAL AGENCY to remain faithful to Bell’s original concept. However, we do also
use these principles to derive another principle that was implicit for Bell in 1964:
Lemma 6. The Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION, and the Postulate of RELATIVIS-
TIC CAUSALITY imply the Principle of NO SUPERDETERMINISM,
where this last is:
Principle 6 (NO SUPERDETERMINISM) Any set of events on a SLH is uncorrelated
with any set of freely chosen actions subsequent to that SLH.
The name of this Principle is taken from Bell [12], and its form chosen in keeping
with the assumption of PREDETERMINATION below.
Unlike LOCAL CAUSALITY, LOCALITY is not sufficient to make a theory BELL-
LOCAL, even with the Principle of NO SUPERDETERMINISM. We require an addi-
tional principle, which, based on Bell’s 1964 paper, we formulate as:
Principle 7 (PREDETERMINATION) For any observable event A, and any SLH S
prior to it, A has CAUSES on S, which, possibly in conjunction with free choices
subsequent to S, determine A.
Applying this to Bell’s scenario, choose the SLH to be prior to both a and b, so
that Bob’s outcome is a function B(a,b,c,λ ). By the Principle of LOCALITY, the
dependence on a must be trivial, because it is space-like-separated from B. Finally,
by the Principle of NO SUPERDETERMINISM, the probability of λ cannot depend
on a and b. Doing the same for A, and following the same argument as in Sec. 5.1
we see that BELL-LOCALITY is obeyed. Thus,
Theorem 6 (Bell-1964, in principles). Quantum PHENOMENA violate the conjunc-
tion of Axioms 1–4 and the Principles of NO SUPERDETERMINISM, LOCALITY, and
PREDETERMINATION.
From the lemmata in this section, we can also formulate this theorem using more
fundamental, and not more numerous, principles, as follows:
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!!! Fig. 4 Two operationalist versions of Bell’s Theorem, 6 and 7. For explanatory details, see Fig. 3.
Theorem 7 (Bell-1964, in deeper principles). Quantum PHENOMENA violate the
conjunction of Axioms 1–4, the Postulate of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, and the
Principles of AGENT-CAUSATION and PREDETERMINATION.
This has the advantage of not using the term ‘locality’, which realists generally use
with a different meaning, as discussed above. These two theorems, and the relation-
ship between them are illustrated in Fig. 4.
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6 Reactions and Reconciliation
Let us now review the forms of Bell’s theorem favoured by the two camps, as for-
mulated in terms of causal principles deeper than those used by Bell in either 1964
or 1976. In all of the below (as in the related figures), we assume the usual
1. Axiom of MACROREALITY,
2. Axiom of MINKOWSKI SPACE-TIME,
3. Axiom of TEMPORAL ORDER,
4. Axiom of CAUSAL ARROW.
First, the realist’s version makes the additional assumptions of
• The Postulate of FREE CHOICE,
• The Postulate of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY,
• REICHENBACH’s Principle.
Of these three, realists reject RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, leaving the question of
what defines PAST in the Axiom of CAUSAL ARROW open to further physical investi-
gation. Operationalists, on the other hand, would reject (or indeed have rejected [6])
REICHENBACH’s Principle. But the latter have reason to be unhappy with the re-
maining list, because the remaining Axioms and Postulates have no empirical con-
sequences. They do not imply even SIGNAL-LOCALITY, for example. Thus the op-
erationalists would be left saying that they privilege the Postulate of RELATIVISTIC
CAUSALITY over REICHENBACH’s Principle even though they cannot point to any
consequences of believing in the former. For this reason the operationalists would,
presumably, object to the list of options offered by this form of Bell’s theorem.
Next we consider the operationalist’s version, which assumes instead
• The Postulate of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY,
• The Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION,
• The Principle of PREDETERMINATION.
Of these three, operationalists reject PREDETERMINATION, embracing the idea of
intrinsic randomness. Realists, on the other hand, would presumably still reject the
Postulate of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY. But the latter have reason not to be happy
with the list of options offered here. The reason is that PREDETERMINATION is just
too easy to reject. Even though many of the theories realists take seriously, such
as de Broglie–Bohm mechanics [42, 43], satisfy PREDETERMINATION, it is not a
necessary feature of realist theories, and realists would not want to be characterized
as basing their rejection of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY on a belief in PREDETER-
MINATION. Realists do not reject the Principle of AGENT-CAUSATION, because it is
implied by REICHENBACH’s Principle and FREE CHOICE (this is just a weaker ver-
sion of Lemma 7 below). But it is the fact that AGENT-CAUSATION is weaker than
REICHENBACH that is the problem, they might say, because it entails the addition
of the third assumption (PREDETERMINATION) which is clearly too strong, and so
too easy to reject. Thus realists do, in fact [25], object to a form of Bell’s theorem
listing PREDETERMINATION as a fundamental assumption.
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It would seem that the two camps are still at an impasse. But by returning to
the Postulates of Sec. 5 we can bridge the gap. From results already discussed, it is
apparent that BELL-LOCALITY can be derived from the Axioms plus
• The Postulate of FREE CHOICE,
• The Postulate of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY,
• The Postulate of COMMON CAUSES,
• The Postulate of DECORRELATING EXPLANATION.
For realists, little has changed from their preferred formulation, and they will as be-
fore, reject RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY. But operationalists now should be happy to
reject DECORRELATING EXPLANATION, and keep the other postulates. The reason
is that
Lemma 7. The Postulates of FREE CHOICE and COMMON CAUSES imply the Prin-
ciple of AGENT-CAUSATION.
This can be seen as follows. Say a set of events A is correlated with a free choice
a. Now by Postulate 1, a has no relevant CAUSES. Thus by Postulate 3, the only
option is that a is a CAUSE of at least one event in A , as in Principle 4. Thus
operationalists still have their agent-centric notion of causation, which operational
quantum mechanics respects, even with the addition of the Postulate of RELATIVIS-
TIC CAUSALITY. Some following this direction believe that a replacement for the
Principle of DECORRELATING EXPLANATION is open to further physical investi-
gation [44]. The attitude each camp would be expected to take to this theorem is
illustrated in Fig. 5.
7 Conclusion
After thorough investigation, we suggest that the cause of the disagreement between
operationalists and realists over Bell’s theorem is a disagreement over causes. This
leads the two camps to favour Bell’s 1964 theorem and Bell’s 1976 theorem respec-
tively, because the localistic notions they employ relate to notions of agent-causation
and explanatory causation respectively. However, by breaking down notions into
more fundamental postulates, we could formulate what we believe is the best ver-
sion of Bell’s theorem, for the purposes of reconciling the two camps:
Theorem 8 (Bell-reconciliation). Quantum PHENOMENA violate the con-
junction of Axioms 1–4 and the Postulates of FREE CHOICE, RELATIVISTIC
CAUSALITY, COMMON CAUSES, and DECORRELATING EXPLANATION.
This formulation avoids contentious words like ‘locality’, and allows each camp
to reject one assumption (DECORRELATING EXPLANATION and RELATIVISTIC
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Fig. 5 The realist and operationalist interpretations of our ‘reconcilation’ version of Bell’s Theo-
rem, 8. For explanatory details, see Fig. 3.
CAUSALITY, respectively), knowing that the remaining assumptions reflect its philo-
sophical position. Of course even if the two camps do agree upon a single form of
Bell’s theorem, their disagreement about which assumption to reject is still a sub-
stantive disagreement. But at least they could discuss the merits of their weltan-
schauungen using a common vocabulary, and so avoid talking past one another,
or (the next stage) interminable arguments about what terms like ‘locality’ should
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mean. If, in the end, they just agree to disagree, that would still be a great improve-
ment over the present state of affairs [1, 26, 45, 46, 47].
Another advantage of the above formulation is that RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY
better reflects the ontology of different quantum interpretations than does a notion
like LOCALITY. As has been stated a few times above, orthodox quantum mechanics
respects LOCALITY, even when it is understood as a realistic theory, an understand-
ing held by most physicists who don’t think long and hard about foundations (and
by some who do). That is, even the process whereby, when Alice and Bob share a
singlet state, a measurement by Alice in a certain basis causes the quantum state
of Bob’s system to collapse instantaneously into one of the basis states, does not
violate LOCALITY. Yet the very wording of the preceding sentence implies that the
described process does violate RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY13. By contrast, opera-
tional quantum mechanics does not violate RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, because it
does not entail any causal narrative involving quantum states, but simply uses them
as computational tools. A more precise formulation of this idea will be given else-
where [10].
A similar example of the advantage of talking about causes is the ability to for-
mulate FREE CHOICE in an obvious way: that a freely chosen action has no relevant
CAUSES14. This can be opposed to Colbeck and Renner’s assumption FR, which
also supposedly corresponds to “the assumption that measurements can be chosen
freely” [49], but which is actually the assumption of LOCAL AGENCY as defined in
Sec. 5.1. As we have seen (Lemma 3), this can be derived from FREE CHOICE only
by also using the Postulates of RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY and COMMON CAUSES
(or something similar). The assumption FR clearly embodies far more than merely
freedom of choice, and interpreting it as if it does not (i.e. taking their language at
face value) leads to bizarre conclusions. For example, Colbeck and Renner would
be forced to claim that a typical physicist (see preceding paragraph), adhering to the
realistic interpretation of orthodox quantum mechanics, does not believe in freedom
of choice, even if said physicist were to believe that humans are not wholly governed
by physical laws and have free will in the strongest possible philosophical sense.
Formalizing notions relating to Bell’s theorem as causal principles also makes it
apparent that some notions are more natural than others. In particular, the notions
13 Notably, the faster-than-light effect of Alice’s choice on Bob’s conditioned state has
now been verified experimentally with no detector efficiency loophole [48], unlike BELL-
NONLOCALITY [14].
14 This may sound like a strong statement, and the reader may feel tempted to follow neither the
operationalist nor the realist camp, but rather to reject Postulate 1 from the list of assumptions in
theorem 8. This temptation should vanish if the reader thinks through what it would actually mean
to explain away Bell-correlations through the real (not just in-principle) failure of FREE CHOICE.
There is no general theory that does this. If such a theory did exist, it would require a grand
conspiracy of causal relationships leading to results in precise agreement with quantum mechanics,
even though the theory itself would bear no resemblance to quantum mechanics. Moreover, it is
hard to imagine why it should only be in Bell experiments that free choices would be significantly
influenced by causes relevant also to the observed outcomes; rather, every conclusion based upon
observed correlations, scientific or casual, would be meaningless because the observers’s method
would always be suspect. It seems to us that any such theory would be about as plausible, and
appealing, as, belief in ubiquitous alien mind-control.
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of LOCALITY and PREDETERMINATION, which Bell introduced in his first paper,
are not very natural. The first is weaker than the notion of LOCAL AGENCY that
can be derived from the more fundamental postulates of AGENT-CAUSATION and
RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY, while the second is even more contrived. The latter
criticism we would also level, even more strongly, at another notion which has been
suggested as a replacement for PREDETERMINATION, namely ‘completeness’ [17]
(or ‘Jarrett-completeness’ as one of us has called it [4]), also known as ‘outcome-
independence’ [18]. In this context, more natural concepts for formulating a theorem
in the style of Bell’s 1964 theorem will be considered elsewhere [10].
Finally, approaching Bell’s theorem using ideas of causation can lead in new
directions. For instance, if one assumes the predictions of relativistic quantum me-
chanics to be correct, then it seems that one can, in Theorem 8, replace the two
Postulates of FREE CHOICE and RELATIVISTIC CAUSALITY by the single Postu-
late of NO FINE-TUNING [7]. This is a postulate that the conditional independence
relations between observable events are a consequence only of the causal structure
(i.e. which events are CAUSES for which other events), and are not to be explained
by fine-tuning of the probabilities of events. Whether this formulation can really be
regarded as having fewer postulates than the above, whether it is truly possible to
dispense with FREE CHOICE, and how the two camps could be expected to react to
it, are interesting questions for exploration.
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